The year Leo Strauss published "Persecution and the Art of Writing" (1941), he prepared a lecture ("German Nihilism") that he never published. An analysis of this lecture shows that Strauss hadn't fully mastered the art of writing he'd discovered in others: his secrets are too exposed. In the context of "German Nihilism," it becomes clear that "Persecution and the Art of Writing" is about liberal persecution of authoritarianism, no the reverse, as liberals would assume. In response to recent apologias presenting (...) Strauss as a liberal who didn't "write between the lines," a Strauss-style reading of "German Nihilism" disproves both claims. (shrink)

The existence of an idea of a missing shade of blue contradicts Hume's first principle that simple ideas all derive from corresponding simple impressions. Hume dismisses the exception to his principle as unimportant. Why does he do so? His later account of distinctions of reason suggests a systematic way of dealing with simple ideas not derived from simple impressions. Why does he not return to the problem of the missing shade, having offered that account? Several suggestions as to Hume's solution (...) of the problem of the missing shade (not all appealing to distinctions of reason) are explored with an eye both to their adequacy as Humean solutions and their value as clues to his dismissal of the problem. Hypotheses concerning the latter perplexity are formulated and discussed as well. Senses in which the missing shade of blue is or may be a red herring are identified. In course, this author names Hume's missing shade marjorie grene. Historians of philosophy will want to adopt this nomenclature. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there can be genuine (as opposed to merely verbal) disputes about whether a sentence form is logically true or an argument form is valid. I call such disputes ?cases of deviance?, of which I distinguish a weak and a strong form. Weak deviance holds if one disputant is right and the other wrong, but the available evidence is insufficient to determine which is which. Strong deviance holds if there is no fact of the matter. (...) In section 2 I argue that weak deviance need not be trivial and may even be interesting. Section 3 considers what it could mean to say that logic is determined by a theory, especially a theory of meaning, an idea that arises in section 2. In section 4 I discuss the dispute between classical and relevance logicians over entailment and argue that it is a case of strong deviance. Finally, in section 5 I show that the result of the previous section is not absolute but relative to the background logic used in reaching it. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay explores the question of what sorts of relations morality permits, requires, or forbids nations, businesses, and individuals to have with South Africa and South Africans. After reflecting on the immorality of apartheid and rebutting several defences of it, the essay turns its attention to several questions that bear on the assessment of foreign policy toward South Africa. The final sections discuss how individuals ought to respond to South African apartheid, focusing on collective boycotts and personal abstentions. The (...) essay critically assesses various proposed boycotts and weighs the significance of symbolic protests of apartheid. (shrink)

In the fall of 1996 I taught a course at Fudan University in Shanghai dealing with medical ethics in America. As part of the course we spent some time on the heated American debate about abortion. The reaction of Chinese students was revealing.

While history is important to Luke as he writes his “orderly account,” history here is the vehicle of kerygmatic art, not art in its modern expression—the chic pastime of a jaded bourgeoisie—but art in service of the conversion and sanctification of the church.

ABSTRACT Nuclear deterrence has struck many people as morally perplexing because it is a case in which it appears to be right to threaten, and in a sense intend, what it would be wrong to do. Section 1 explores the assumptions that are necessary to generate this moral paradox. Some moral theorists, however, have refused to embrace this paradox, contending instead that nuclear deterrence is immoral in principle precisely because it is wrong to threaten that which it would be immoral (...) to do. Section 2 rebuts this contention and seeks to reduce the apparent paradoxicality of nuclear deterrence to manageable proportions. This is not to maintain, though, that nuclear deterrence is morally permissible in the world in which we live; consequently, Section 3 surveys some of the factors relevant to a moral assessment of the legitimacy of the actual practice of nuclear deterrence. (shrink)